My purpose here is to propose a consistent framework and terminology for epistemology.
Consciousness is a specific, peculiar kind of relation between an entity like ourselves (called the Subject); and any ‘appearance’, ‘phenomenon’, ‘thing’ …
Nagarjuna, together with other Buddhists, denies the existence of a real “self” in man[1], i.e. that the “I” of each person is a soul or spiritual entity distinct from his physical body. This concept, referred to as the “atman”, was regarded in Indian (Hi…
One notable radical difference with ordinary thinking in our place and time is the Buddhist notion that we have no self. The Buddhist outlook stems from the position of Indian philosophy that all that we can cognize are dharmas, that is (in a primary sense) c…
My purpose here is to propose a theory of volition; or more precisely, a theory of the locations and sequences of its operation, because at this stage a formal definition of volition as a causal relation is still not ripe.…
It is interesting … to compare our … conclusion concerning ‘wanting’ as the driver of obsessions and compulsions, and the Buddhist principle that ‘desire’ is at the root of all human action (creating karma and thence further ‘desire’, in a seemingly endl…
Granting the Monist thesis [briefly described in the preceding chapters], we can understand that our respective apparent individual selves, whether they are viewed as souls (entities with a spiritual substance distinct from mind and matter) or as s…
Buddhist philosophers have stressed the idea of impermanence, with a view to deny the existence of “essences” in both the objective and subjective domains. However, an impermanent essence is not a contradiction in terms. This means that the questio…
As we saw in the examples of Hume’s psychological theories of generalization as habit and of causation as association of ideas, he tended in practice to engage in faulty induction (and of course, faulty deduction).
He synthesized from a little data or a su…